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ON BEHALF OF MAVERICK MOLINISM 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig 
In clarifying and defending Molinism, Thomas Flint argues against a posi-
tion he terms Maverick Molinism. This version of Molinism maintains that, 
though counterfactuals of freedom have their truth-value logically prior to 
God's acts of will, God could have so acted that these counterfactuals 
would have had a different truth value from that which they actually have. 
Flint believes this position is flawed, and presents an argument for rejecting 
it. I argue that Flint's argument against Maverick Molinism is flawed, and 
suggest that the Maverick has a position with advantages over more tradi-
tional versions of Molinism. 
Molinism is constructed to preserve a strong view of God's sovereignty as 
well as a libertarian conception of human freedom. It does so by maintain-
ing that human beings are free in the libertarian sense, but that there are 
counterfactuals of freedom that describe what a person would do (freely) 
in given circumstances. Other views that deny that human beings are free 
in the libertarian sense may also affirm that there exist counterfactuals of 
freedom, but they will not hold that the kind of freedom in question is the 
kind libertarians cherish. So we might describe the Molinist position as 
accounting for God's sovereign control over the course of affairs in virtue 
of his knowledge of which counterfactuals of libertarian freedom are true 
and which are false. 
Beyond this minimal commitment of any Molinist are various embell-
ishments. Some embellishments are dictated by logic. For example, this 
characterization leaves open the question of whether counterfactuals of lib-
ertarian freedom are true in virtue of God's choices, i.e., whether their truth 
value is divinely postvolitional. There is a straightforward argument 
against the view that counterfactuals of freedom have their truth value in 
virtue of God's acts of will. For if God makes it true that Joe would kick his 
dog in certain circumstances, then Joe does not have the power to do other 
than to kick his dog in those circumstances. And if he does not have this 
power, then the counterfactual in question is not a counterfactual of liber-
tarian freedom. If this argument is sound, as I will grant here, it is a further 
commitment of Molinism to hold that counterfactuals of libertarian free-
dom are divinely prevolitional-that is, their truth value does not obtain in 
virtue of any act of God's will. 
Though I am granting the soundness of the above argument, I want to 
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emphasize its significance a bit. Note that the concept of prevolitional 
truth is not understood here in terms of what God has control over. To say 
that a truth is prevolitional is only to deny that its truth value is the direct 
result of God's choices. To ask whether God has power or control over 
these truth-values is to ask a question that must be answered by some 
inference from the concept of prevolitional truth and other theistic commit-
ments about the nature of God. 
This last point leads to the heart of what I want to argue, for many stan-
dard Molinists affirm not only that counterfactuals of libertarian freedom 
are prevolitional, but that they are also beyond God's control. They hold, 
that is, that there is nothing God could do which would have resulted in a 
counterfactual of libertarian freedom having a different truth value from 
what it actually has. Consider, for example, Thomas P. Flint's account: 
For, though God's middle knowledge will as a matter of fact remain 
the same no matter what he does, this isn't a necessary truth. To put 
the same point more precisely: any element of God's middle knowl-
edge will be true no matter what God does, but it is entirely possible 
for that element to be false and yet for God to choose to act.1 
Flint claims that though it is possible for such counterfactuals to be false 
and for God to choose to act (this conjunction is possible in part because 
counterfactuals of libertarian freedom are contingent), the truth-value of 
such counterfactuals is thoroughly insulated from God's activity. Flint 
explicitly puts his point in future-tense terms: any counterfactual of free-
dom will be true no matter what God does. For this claim to be true, all 
that needs to be true is that there is nothing God could do to change the 
truth value of any counterfactual of freedom. As we shall see below, how-
ever, I think Flint intends a different point, for the position he wishes to 
argue against doesn't claim that God can change the truth value of coun-
terfactuals of freedom, but rather that God has counterfactual power over 
them. So what Flint is committed to is the claim that, for any proposition x 
which is a true counterfactual of libertarian freedom, there is no choice or 
action within God's power to perform such that, were he to perform it, x 
would be false.2 
Not only do typical Molinists endorse this claim that there is nothing 
God could do to that would have made such counterfactuals false, they 
identify it with the earlier claim that counterfactuals of libertarian freedom 
are prevolitional. Flint's language is especially instructive in this regard. 
The context in which Flint discusses this issue regards a certain kind of 
counterfactual, the particular kind being unimportant, regarding which 
some who are otherwise favorably disposed toward Molinism might 
be tempted to challenge the alleged prevolitional status of such 
truths. That is, they may want to say that a Molinist can hold that, 
whichever truth-value [such] a counterfactual ... has, there neverthe-
less were things God had the power to do such that, had he done 
them, that counterfactual would have had the opposite truth-value.3 
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Flint labels the position in question "Maverick Molinism," and argues that 
it is untenable.4 He thereby commits himself not only to the view cited 
above that there is nothing God can do to change the truth-value of coun-
terfactuals of freedom, but that he doesn't have counterfactual power over 
them either. Maverick Molinists hold no brief about the first point, but dis-
agree with him about the second. 
I don't think Flint's argument is successful. I will show that the argu-
ment he gives is flawed, and that his position imposes a severe epistemic 
burden on Molinism. This burden is damaging, because Molinism enjoys a 
privileged status in that it resolves the apparent conflict between divine 
sovereignty and human freedom by appealing to counterfactual claims 
that are endorsed regularly by common folk. That is, it relies on the kind 
of judgments that people ordinarily make or presuppose in everyday life 
about what free individuals would do in certain circumstances.5 If it 
incurred no epistemic burdens along the way, the Molinist could be con-
tent with rebutting criticisms of his view, relying on the intuitive advan-
tages of the position to provide sufficient warrant for belief. Flint's posi-
tion loses this intuitive advantage because it endorses problematic claims 
along the way, so his position leaves the Molinist in a position of needing 
to do more than rebut criticisms in order to establish the tenability of the 
view. The lesson will be that the most attractive versions of Molinism will 
refuse to endorse Flint's restrictions on Molinist family membership. 
I begin with Flint's argument against Maverick Molinism, which pro-
ceeds as follows. First, he argues that even if a counterfactual such as 
A ---;oB is postvolitionally true, so that there are propositions C and 0 with-
in God's power to bring about such that C---;o(A~B) and D~-(A~B), 
these latter two truths must be prevolitional on pain of an infinite regress 
of things that God would have to do to make A -B true. Call this step the 
vicious regress premise. 
Next, Flint claims that the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle (LCEM) 
should be endorsed by all Molinists, including the Maverick. The context 
of the discussion leaves open that Flint only wishes to endorse a limited 
version of that law, applied to counterfactuals of world actualization, 
where, using the formulas of the previous paragraph, B is a complete pos-
sible world, and A, C, and 0 are states of affairs maximal with respect to 
what God can strongly actualize. I will initially evaluate the argument 
applied to counterfactuals of freedom generally, and then to the more 
restricted class of world actualization counterfactuals, so I will begin by 
attributing to Flint an unrestricted endorsement of LCEM.6 Call this step 
the LCEM hypothesis. 
Finally, Flint presents the reductio step. For counterfactual of world 
actualization A ~B, consider the expanded counterfactuals C ~(A ~B) 
and C~-(A -B). By the LCEM hypothesis, one of these two must be 
true, regardless of the value for C. So suppose C = A. Then either 
A -(A ~B) or A ~-(A -B). Since the first is logically equivalent to A -B, 
the two could not differ regarding their status as prevolitional or postvo-
litional. But the vicious regress premise requires that they do so differ. 
Hence, the only option is that A ~-(A -B). But this claim can't be true 
either. For -(A -B) entails (A --B) (by LCEM), and so A --(A -B) is 
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logically equivalent to A ----;.(A ----;.~B), which is logically equivalent to 
A ----;.~B. This latter claim must therefore be prevolitional, and since it is 
equivalent to ~(A ----;.B), this latter claim must be prevolitional as well. So, 
both A ----;.B and ~(A ----;.B) have to be prevolitional, but that is contrary to 
the Maverick's hypothesis. Hence Maverick Molinism is not a legitimate 
form of Molinism at all. 
There are two major flaws in this argument, as I see it. First, the LCEM 
step is suspect. Flint never argues for the claim that Molinists ought to 
endorse such a principle, and I can't see why the reasons for thinking that 
LCEM is false don't apply to the counterfactuals the Molinist endorses. I 
must admit that I am unpersuaded by the purported counterexamples to 
LCEM, such as the relationship between the two claims Reagan and 
Gorbachev are compatriots and Reagan was born in Russia. I would not 
endorse either the claim that the first counterfactually implies the second, 
or that it implies its negation, but that refusal might arise from epistemo-
logical uncertainty rather than the failure of LCEM.7 
It may be that Molinists don't need to accept LCEM, but only a restrict-
ed version of it applying to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Yet, if 
Molinists use such examples as the one above as part of the explanation of 
the failure of LCEM, they should also find counterexamples of the same 
sort regarding counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. We have as much 
reason to refuse to endorse either of 
If I were offered both Blue Bell ice cream and Godiva chocolates, but could 
only choose one of the two, I freely would choose the ice cream 
and 
If I were offered both Blue Bell ice cream and Godiva chocolates, but could 
only choose one of the two, I freely would not choose the ice cream 
as we do with the two claims regarding Gorbachev and Reagan. 
Note also that there is no rescue squad encountered by insisting that the 
antecedent of such a counterfactual of creaturely freedom be maximal, fully 
specific regarding the entirety of the circumstances in which I am situated. 
For even if the antecedent contains all feature of the history of a possible 
world up to the moment of free choice in question, there is no reason to be 
found for thinking that the world in which I take the ice cream is closer to 
the actual world than the world in which I do not take the ice cream. 
It is not hard to see why a Molinist would find (a suitable refinement of) 
LCEM attractive, however. For the Molinist wishes to retain a strong view 
of sovereignty and if there are violations of LCEM regarding counterfactu-
als of freedom, it looks as if there would be a kind of uncertainty in the 
mind of God regarding what would happen were he to actualize the 
antecedent of a false counterfactual of freedom. For, according to the 
Molinist, it is in virtue of God's knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom 
that he knows which world would be actual in virtue of his creative acts of 
will, and his sovereign control over the course of affairs depends on this 
middle knowledge. If, however, God's middle knowledge is "gappy," if it 
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leaves undetermined which of a variety of alternatives would occur in cer-
tain circumstances, then God's sovereign control over the course of history 
is threatened. So it is not surprising to find a Molinist such as Flint endors-
ingLCEM. 
An explanation is not a justification, however. What is needed is an 
argument why the law is true in spite of the weight of the evidence against 
it. Perhaps such an argument can be found by highlighting the relation-
ship between philosophical work on vagueness and LCEM. A standard 
view of vagueness is metaphysical-that vagueness is a part of the world, 
and not merely a feature of our language or a limitation on our epistemic 
capacities. The metaphysical view of vagueness has an intuitive advantage 
over the two alternatives just mentioned, but careful investigation of the 
issues may require endorsing an epistemic view of vagueness/ with a con-
comitant endorsement of the counterintuitive idea that there really is a pre-
cise number of grains of sand needed to form a heap. Along the same 
lines, it may be counterintuitive to have to claim that one of the two claims 
If I were offered both Blue Bell ice cream and Godiva chocolates, but could 
only choose one of the two, I would choose the ice cream 
and 
If I were offered both Blue Bell ice cream and Godiva chocolates, but could 
only choose one of the two, I would not choose the ice cream 
is true, but such counterintuitive results may be forced on us. Perhaps, 
that is, the similarity relation between worlds really is precise and is such 
that no two distinct worlds can be equally similar to a third. I won't press 
this argument here, but I'm inclined to think that the only way to provide 
an adequate motivation for the idea that two distinct worlds can be equally 
similar to a third is by treating similarity as a vague (and perhaps contextu-
al) relation. If I'm right, then if the epistemic view of vagueness is the only 
defensible position, LCEM may be true after all. 
Suppose, however, that no such argument is successful; how should we 
think about Molinism in such a case? Perhaps the conclusion to draw is 
that the plausibility of Molinism is tied to LCEM, as suggested above, but 
there may be another way out. Perhaps God would only create compatible 
with LCEM, so that even though there are possible violations of LCEM, 
there are no actual violations of it, and hence God's sovereignty is pre-
served. Such a view requires endorsing Einstein's conception of God as 
one who doesn't throw dice with his creation (though it is interesting to 
note that it doesn't require holding that there are no irreducibly probabilis-
tic events-these can be tolerated as long as there are counterfactuals of 
indeterminacy analogous to counterfactuals of freedom). On the negative 
side, however, such a view still faces the modal problem of allowing the 
possibility that God's sovereignty is compromised by human freedom. 
The point of this discussion is to highlight the centrality and controver-
siality of the LCEM step of Flint's argument. It is controversial in part 
because Flint's discussion seems to indicate an acceptance of the law driven 
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by Molinist requirements instead of some decent argument for it, and in 
part because the best arguments that I know of for endorsing the law have 
precisely the same counterintuitive aspects involved in the epistemic view 
of vagueness. Since I find the epistemic view of vagueness to be superior to 
known alternatives, I am not as bothered by the analogy as will be those 
less enamored with that view. Equally important, the step is central to 
Flint's argument, for without it, the reductio step can't be developed, and 
no decisive reason will have been given for rejecting Maverick Molinism. 
Even if the reductio step fails, however, there still may be a residual 
worry regarding Maverick Molinism. For even without the reductio, it is 
hard to see where the regress should be stopped, and without some 
account of why it should be stopped at some particular point, perhaps 
the best conclusion to draw is that it should never have been started in 
the first place. This conclusion is just a denial of the Maverick's position, 
so even if we politely decline the invitation to endorse LCEM, there may 
be still be a worry that the Maverick cannot give a non-arbitrary account 
of where to draw the line. 
The worry depends on the regress in question being vicious, and it is 
not obvious that it is. All Flint shows is that, if embraced, the regress 
requires that God do an infinite number of things in order to exercise con-
trol over the truth value of any counterfactual of freedom. But why think 
that God can't perform such an infinite task? It is far from clear that infi-
nite tasks are themselves impossible/ and if they are not, then we have a 
prima facie case that God, an omnipotent being, could perform one. 
Yet, I don't wish to rescue the Maverick by appealing to the possibility 
of infinite tasks (in part because of disanalogies between the two cases), so 
I will grant Flint the point that the regress is vicious. Still there is a second 
major problem with the argument, arising from the distinction between 
what is in God's control and what is postvolitional for God. 
As I granted above, it is a logical requirement on Molinism that counter-
factuals of freedom be prevolitional. Hence if we define a version of 
Molinism which counts some counterfactuals of freedom as postvolitional, 
the resulting position will be inconsistent. So, pretty clearly, Maverick 
Molinism better not affirm that counterfactuals of freedom are postvolition-
al. Yet, it looks as if that is precisely how Flint interprets the view. In fair-
ness to Flint, things are not quite that simple, since the context of discussion 
concerns only those counterfactuals of world actualization which have a 
specification of a complete possible world as their consequent and a largest 
state of affairs that God can strongly actualize as antecedent. But it's not 
clear why someone attracted to the Maverick position need view such coun-
terfactuals as different in kind from ordinary counterfactuals of freedom. 
And if we do not treat them differently, then we must say of this special 
kind of counterfactual that it too is divinely prevolitional. What the 
Maverick denies is not the prevolitional status of such truths, but only the 
claim that their truth value is outside God's control. The crucial point main-
tained by the Maverick should be that a counterfactual's being divinely pre-
volitional is not the same as a counterfactual's being outside God's control. 
Flint conflates these two claims, as the passage quoted earlier shows. In 
the first sentence (/[S]ome who are otherwise favorably disposed toward 
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Molinism might be tempted to challenge the alleged prevolitional status of 
such truths"), Flint makes clear that the position he is discussing challenges 
the prevolitional status of certain counterfactuals, while the second sen-
tence ("That is, they may want to say that a Molinist can hold that, 
whichever truth-value [such] a counterfactual ... has, there nevertheless 
were things God had the power to do such that, had he done them, that 
counterfactual would have had the opposite truth-value") identifies this 
claim with the claim that there are things God could have done that would 
have resulted in those counterfactuals having a different truth value. This 
latter claim is clearly a claim about which truth are within God's control, 
not a claim about which truths are prevolitional. 
A Maverick need not conflate these two claims. It can be granted that the 
first claim entails the second, that is, that if a truth is divinely postvolitional, 
then it's truth value is within God's control. The second does not entail the 
first, however. That is, it could be true that certain claims are true indepen-
dently of God's acts of will and yet there be acts or choices that God could 
have performed which would have resulted in those claims being false. 
The argument that the power claim does not entail the volition claim is 
simple. There are lots of truths that are true independently of our wills, 
and yet we have or had the power to act in such a way that those truths 
would not have been true. For example, snow is found at certain precise 
spatiotemporal points north of where I live, but no act of will on my part 
caused the snow to be there. Yet, there are things I could do or could have 
done which would have prevented the presence of snow at some such par-
ticular spot. (I'm not claiming I can control the weather, but I can control 
whether snow is on a particular piece of ground, still owning the shovel so 
necessary to endure winters in northern Indiana.) So the power claim sim-
ply does not entail the volitional claim. 
Of course, there could be something about God's will that makes claim 
about what he has power over entail claims about his volitions. But it is 
instructive that Flint nowhere gives such an argument. Molinism's oppo-
nents do have such an argument, for they can maintain that all contin-
gent truths depend directly on the will of God. Molinists cannot give 
such an argument, however, for it is constitutive of their view that some 
contingent truths are true independently of the will of God. Since the 
Molinist grants this point already, and since the general entailment claim 
about the relationship between power and volition is false, I see no rea-
son to think a Molinist is forced to embrace the entailment claim when it 
is restricted to divine scope. 
Moreover, it would be paradoxical indeed for there to be such an argu-
ment. For take any contingently false counterfactual A -->-B. Even if A-->-B 
is false, it is still possible that there is some contingent proposition C which 
is such that if it were true, A -->-B would be true.1O For example, it is contin-
gently true that if I were offered a choice between asparagus and beans for 
dinner, I'd not choose beans. Things could have happened to alter my 
preferences, however. The proliferation of special pests that blunted the 
growth of beans but allowed asparagus to flourish would have led to 
much more asparagus consumption in my youth, and to a preference for 
the unusual taste of beans over that of asparagus (I'm assuming here that 
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the core of the explanation of my preference for asparagus over green 
beans is the rarity of the former over the latter in my diet). So, suppose 
that this is an example in which C -(A -B) is true, even though the coun-
terfactual embedded in the consequent is false. For that embedded coun-
terfactual to be within God's control, we need only assume that God could 
make C true (could strongly actualize that state of affairs), and it would be 
perplexing indeed to find someone denying that claim. So, if God could 
actualize C, then God has power over the truth value of A -B, even if we 
assume with Molinism that the truth value of A -B is prevolitional. 
One might think that the example above is convincing only because the 
antecedent of the conditional is not maximal, Le., that its antecedent does 
not include the entire history of a possible world up to the preference for 
asparagus. Maximal specificity is no more help here, however, than it was 
earlier. What is at issue regarding whether a particular counterfactual is 
true is how close, or similar, possible worlds are to each other. If there is a 
world God could actualize such that the "A-B"-worlds are farther away 
from the world thus actualized than some "-(A-B),,-worlds, then there is 
something God could do that would have made that counterfactual false. 
Maximal specificity of antecedents is simply a red herring here; the argu-
ment turns only on the critical fact that the similarity relation between 
worlds allows four worlds to be such that the first is closer than the second 
to the third, while the second is closer than the first to the fourth. 
So this version of (Maverick) Molinism has an important advantage 
over Flint-style Molinism. For Flint-style Molinism is saddled with having 
to impose additional restrictions on God's omnipotence in the face of the 
above, if its defenders insist on maintaining that God has no control over 
the truth value of counterfactuals of libertarian freedom. Flint-style 
Molinists will have to hold in cases like that above that God cannot in fact 
actualize C, even though C is contingent and not obviously of any of the 
usual sorts of contingent truths that defenders of omnipotence allow to be 
irrelevant to the claim of omnipotence. l1 If we talk about entire worlds 
rather than sets of circumstances, Flint-style Molinism will have to infer the 
unactualizability of world C from the fact that the truth value of A -B is 
prevolitional, an inference threatened by a confusion between prevolition-
ality and lack of control. 
So there is an alternative position to the one Flint attacks that doesn't 
construe counterfactuals as postvolitional, but still claims that they are 
within God's control. What happens when we try to apply Flint's argu-
ment to this position? In a word, it collapses. In particular, the vicious 
regress step must be abandoned. That step, recall, claimed that if A-B 
were postvolitional, then C -(A -B) had better be prevolitional, for other-
wise a regress is launched that would require God to do an infinite number 
of things in order to fix the truth value of A -B. But if A -B is conceived of 
as prevolitional, as well as any proposition embedding A -B as the conse-
quent of a longer counterfactual, then the truth-value of such propositions 
doesn't require any particular divine activity in order to obtain. There are, 
of course, things God could do that would make their truth-value other 
than what it is, since the truth-value of such claims are within the reach of 
God's power, but no regress of actions is launched since no action by God 
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is required to fix the truth-value in the first place. 
One might still worry that there is a regress problem in the neighbor-
hood, in the following way. Suppose again that A ---'"B is false and that 
C ---'"(A ---'"B) is true. Isn't there the regress worry that if God chooses to exer-
cise his power over A ---'"B, that there will be an infinite series of things he'll 
have to do to exercise such power? The idea here, I take it is that there 
might be a further claim D--->(C---'"-(A ---'"B)), which is also true, and so if God 
choose to make A ---'"B true, he'll not only have to actualize C, but also actual-
ize -D. TI1e last point contains the mistake: he'll only have to fail to actual-
ize D, and that requires no special action on his part, so no infinite regress is 
launched. 
Throughout all of this there remains the residual worry that a lot of con-
tingent truths are turning out to be true independently of God's volition, and 
that is, to my mind, the most serious difficulty with this entire discussion. I 
want to reiterate, however, that this aspect is a central tenet of any Molinist 
position, and the point of this paper is not to take on objections to Molinism 
per se, but rather to investigate a particular kind of family squabble within 
the Molinist community. It is part of official Molinist doctrine that many 
contingent truths are true independently of God's choices, so in the context 
of the present dispute, one cannot argue against Maverick Molinism on 
grounds that it implies that there is a large number of such truths. 
Flint began his discussion of Maverick Molinism by suggesting that not 
even charity should allow us to recognize this position as a legitimate ver-
sion of Molinism. Instead, Flint claims, it should be viewed as something 
more akin to heresy. Perhaps the correct picture is that it is only here that 
Molinism and orthodoxy form a philosophically happy union. 
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